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The Canadian Position in the World Economic Context
Percy T. Eastham*

title of this session of this conference reminds me of the story of the
The
blind men who encountered an elephant

for the first time. If you are
familiar with the story you may remember that each individual came into
contact with a different part of the animal and based on their necessarily
limited knowledge each arrived at a different conclusion as to the nature
of the whole beast.
In attempting to define the "world economic context," I think we
are all a little bit like one of those blind men trying to describe a very
large and complex organism based upon limited information and
strongly influenced by the situation in which we happen to find ourselves
in relation to the whole. Moreover, in attempting to understand the
larger context with which our national economies interact, we must also
deal with the fact that the "elephant" in question is constantly and rapidly evolving.
Keeping this general limitation in mind, there are certain features on
which most analysts would agree. First, I will outline for you what I
believe those features are, then I will go on to look at the Canadian
perspective on the position which Canada and the United States currently occupy, in relation to the rest of the international community our view of the elephant so to speak.
The Conference Board of Canada highlights its view that the world
economy appears to be entering a period of retrenchment with the phrase
"Growth ain't what it used to be." Rates of growth in most industrialized countries have declined markedly since the first oil shock and we
seem to be entering a period in which, for the short-term at least, lackluster growth rates may continue to be the norm. It looks as though the
immediate cause of this most recent deceleration in growth is the fact
that the U.S. economy has apparently reached the limits of its ability to
fuel the world economy by purchasing imports. As U.S. Department of
Commerce merchandise trade figures for the last two months of 1987 and
January of this year show, the biggest import shopping spree in history is
coming to an end.
This will probably mean that the world economy over the next year
or two will only grow about 2-2.5%. Some economists refer to this as
"the muddling-through scenario." Analysts also put U.S. growth rates
in this general range, with the prospect of a possible downturn heighten* Executive Director General, U.S. Branch, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa.
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ing in 1989 or 1990. There is, therefore, the prospect of the continuation
of the long-term trend toward moderating growth coupled with recent
exchange rate-driven adjustment in the U.S. import/export imbalance.
This means that considerable new pressure will be placed on other industrialized countries, notably Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany,
to pick up the slack in the short-term. From a Canadian perspective, the
need to ensure the careful management of this transition period puts a
premium on international economic cooperation at this time so that, as
E.M. Forster said, the machine does not stop.
Canadian support for international cooperation in trade and economic relations is a pragmatic response to the situation we find ourselves
in as a result of our history and geography. We may lack the panache of
latter-day Venetians, but we are decidedly a nation of traders - more
than a quarter of our gross national product is derived from international
trade. This figure makes trade comparatively more important to us than
to the Japanese as a source of national wealth.
Most of Canada's trade in the recent past has followed the natural
north-south axis of this continent. Over seventy-five percent of our exports went to the United States in 1987 while almost seventy percent of
our imports last year were purchased from the United States. This latter
figure represents roughly one fifth of total U.S. exports. Not only are we
each others' best customer, but we have the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. The extent of the relationship was recently highlighted by President Reagan when he pointed out that the province of
Ontario buys more from the United States than does Japan.
The Canadian Government's decision to seek a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") with the United States is the first
track in a two track approach to international trade relations. The second track is the Canadian commitment to the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") negotiations. From
Canada's vantage point the FTA and the GATT are complementary and
mutually reinforcing. Our goal in the bilateral negotiations was to produce an agreement which was not only fully consistent with our current
GATT obligations, but which could also serve as a model and catalyst
for the treatment of certain issues in the Uruguay Round.
Despite this, Canada and the United States have been called upon
on numerous occasions to assure other countries that the FTA is not and
was never intended to be, a protectionist pact. One of the FTA's major
advantages is that it should make both Canada and the United States
more, not less, open to expanded trade liberalization. There is no real
basis for assuming that it could be used to establish a kind of "Fortress
North America" into which both countries can retreat. It was clear from
the outset that the achievement of the FTA would require us to overcome the strong pull of the parochial interests of those protectionist
forces which are so successful in making the front pages. It is always
difficult to make the case for long-term, national benefits in the face of

Eastham-CANADA IN WORLD ECON. CONTEXT

opposition form narrower sectoral interests. The negotiations leading to
the FIA were intense and hard fought with neither side getting everything it wanted. Both sides did, however, finally arrive at an Agreement
which contains most of their principal objectives.
For our part, Canada has obtained more secure and enhanced access
to the U.S. market not only for our goods, but for a wide range of services as well. We have come to agreement on binding dispute settlement
procedures which are comprehensive and have effective enforcement
mechanisms. They are probably the best procedures ever negotiated and
we hope that they will produce results equal to their conception.
The comprehensive nature of the FTA meant that the Canadian and
American negotiating teams had to frame an Agreement which took into
account the differences between our two societies. Fundamental concerns from the Canadian point of view about our cultural sovereignty,
our commitment to comprehensive social welfare programs and our
unique approach to the reduction of economic disparities among the various regions of our extraordinarily diverse country meant that certain exceptions were required. Negotiators are not normally fond of exceptions,
but they were necessary to achieving the Agreement.
The stimulus that that FTA will provide to the Canadian and the
U.S. economies should be a very significant factor in enhancing the ability of a number of sectors in both economies to compete in international
markets. This may actually be the most important long-term benefit to
come out of the Agreement.
In this context, I do not see the comparative decline in the competitiveness of the U.S. economy in the last few years as signaling the beginning of a permanent eclipse of American economic power. I do not
believe that Canada has hitched its trade wagon to a falling star in signing the FrA, as some anti-FTA forces in Canada have contended. The
turnaround in the U.S. trade position on a volume basis over the last year
and a half, a turnaround which appears now to be having a significant
impact on the value of the U.S. trade balance, gives ample proof of the
resilience of the U.S. economy.
However, it would be wrong for anyone to assume that the worst is
undoubtedly behind us, with October 19, 1987, as the demarcation point,
and that the problem is on its way to correcting itself without the need
for further governmental action. As previously mentioned, the Canadian
Government believes that the need for international coordination of economic policy remains high and the Prime Minister has indicated that he
will be pushing hard for progress in this area at the Toronto Summit.
The Prime Minister has also recently identified the Toronto Summit as
an occasion for giving momentum to the Uruguay Round of the GATT.
Canada is particularly hopeful that-a commitment by the Summit countries on progress toward agricultural reforms will provide the impetus for
the Mid-term Review Conference of the Uruguay Round, which Canada
will be hosting later this year in Montreal.
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In negotiating the FTA, the Canadian and U.S. negotiators were
fully aware of the importance that both governments attach to the need
for reform of the international agricultural trading system. The FTA
contains significant benefits for Canadian and U.S. producers in the liberalization of bilateral agricultural trade. It also recognizes the fact that
the most serious problems go beyond the bilateral sphere and will require
multilateral cooperation if they are to be resolved. The ETA acknowledges the need for cooperation between Canada and the United States in
addressing issues such as subsidies and import restrictions, while seeking
to enhance the competitive balance in the international agricultural marketplace. The agricultural trade chapter in the FTA is just one area
where the provisions make clear that further negotiations toward trade
liberalization are necessary.
If the ETA is to really represent a win/win situation for both countries, the momentum which it establishes must not be allowed to flag.
Special interests in either country cannot be allowed to derail its implementation on the grounds that it does not perfectly satisfy their own narrowly defined needs. The emphasis should be on building on the
accomplishment and moving beyond it.
It is interesting to note that similar issues have become contentious
in both Canada and the United States. In fact, the manner in which
opponents of various elements of the Agreement in each country present
their cases sometimes seem to be an ironic reflection of one another. Canadian nationalists have attacked the FTA as a threat to Canadian political sovereignty, arguing that the United States will come to be
completely dominant in Canadian economic decision making and the
power thus acquired will unduly influence Canadian domestic and foreign policy. This line of argument takes its ultimate inspiration from a
tradition of general suspicion in certain segments of the Candian population with regard to U.S. motives and ambitions. One might call this current manifestation of the phenomenon "patriotic protectionism," the idea
being that having an economy more or less closed to U.S. competition is
the best way of preventing any evolutionary drift towards continentalism.
In the United States, the sovereignty question has been argued on constitutional grounds. U.S. concerns in this country seem to have centered
primarily around Canada's insistence that the Agreement's dispute settlement mechanisms be binding and that the determinations of the binational panels should be final and not subject to domestic judicial review. From the Canadian perspective, this seems to be a logical means of
ensuring impartiality; to many Americans it appears to be a denial of
their right of due process.
A similar ironic mirroring of concerns is evident when one considers
the provisions in the FTA which govern trade in energy. In Canada,
opponents of the Agreement argue that we are locking ourselves into a
continental energy system in which American demand will dictate the
development of the Canadian energy sector and add to the cost paid for
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energy by Canadian consumers. In the United States, on the other hand,
small oil and gas producers object to the FTA because they see enhanced
access to Canadian supplies as a disincentive in the short-term to investment in exploration in the United States and a possible threat to current
pricing arrangements. Specifically, coal producers object to the FTA,
fearing that it will facilitate new exports of Canadian hydroelectric
power. Therefore, in the energy field, the situation is one in which Canadian opposition centers on fears regarding the consequences of excessive
U.S. demand, while in the United States the special interests are concerned with the problems which may be created for them due to increased availability of alternative energy sources.
Both groups are misconstruing the intent of the FTA's energy provisions which seek first and foremost to promote liberalization of the energy marketplace. The energy provisions recognize that assured access
for Canadian exports to the U.S. market must be matched by assurances
of the continuity of supplies to be delivered under the terms of freely
negotiated contracts. What industry or sector-specific special interests
obscure in their zeal to defend their current position in the marketplace is
that the implementation of the FTA should ultimately lead to a strengthening of the North American industrial base. It will help to restore the
recently lost competitiveness of North American goods against foreign
products. It will not limit consumer choices, increase costs or discourage
innovation and productivity in any sector.
The FTA is a concrete manifestation of our mutual commitment to
general trade liberalization. It is fully consistent with GATT obligations
and should serve as a model for the Uruguay Round. The response from
Canada's other trading partners has generally been positive, but they
will still require some convincing that the Agreement will be trade creating rather than trade diverting.
The Japanese are concerned about the impact of the automotive provision and their general competitive position after all tariffs are removed.
Our European trading partners wonder about the impact of enhanced
"bilateralism" and trade diversion. They express specific concerns about
the possible loss of markets for footwear and automobiles, among other
products. The newly industrialized countries in the Far East are concerned that their clothing and textiles may have to compete in a more
cost-efficient environment. The international community is keeping a
very close watch at this time. They are, for the most part, supportive of
the FTA and, I believe, genuinely hopeful that we can clear the final
hurdles and implement the Agreement. However, they want assurances
that we are not entrenching bilateralism by means of the FTA. They will
be looking to both countries to provide evidence of our commitment to
multilateral trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round.
The expectations of our other trading partners clearly enhance the
downside risks involved should we allow the implementation of the ETA
to be derailed by domestic sectoral or political special interests in either
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Canada or the United States. There is no doubt that the demise of the
FTA would have a chilling effect upon the conduct of the multinational
negotiations.
If Canada and the United States cannot finally arrive at a mutually
acceptable arrangement it is hard to imagine that the rest of the international trading community will be able to set aside their differences and
make the kind of hard choices that everyone will be called upon to confront as the Uruguay Round progresses. Equally important is the fact
that if the FrA is not implemented, both Canada and the United States
will undoubtedly lose some credibility as participants in the multinational negotiations. How can we reasonably expect others to believe that
we will be able to deliver on our commitments to them when we cannot
deliver to each other?
The position of Canada and the United States in the economic context will be vitally affected over the course of the next few months, and
possibly years, by whether or not we show the necessary political will
and recognize that the overall achievement of the FTA must be preserved. The FTA provides a blueprint for the development of our trade
and economic relations which could serve us both well into the next century. It also breaks some significant new ground with respect to provisions on trade in services and in agricultural products. Furthermore, it
can serve as an example of how cooperation can foster enhanced competitiveness. The implementation of the FTA will perform a function which
is not only valuable, but perhaps essential to ensuring the continued orderly development of our national economies and to the larger task of
promoting the expansion and liberalization of world trade.

